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Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict: Take Two 
 
Vladimir Rauta 
 
[abstract] 
While proxy wars have been around since time immemorial, the last decade of 
conflict has seen a rise in their strategic appeal. In the same way that sub-state 
violence captured the attention of policymakers and academics at the end of the 
Cold War, proxy wars are now a core feature of the contemporary and future 
strategic and security environment. Vladimir Rauta argues for a relocation of proxy 
wars by conceptualising them as strategic bargains waged on more complex grounds 
than risk avoidance, cost efficiency and deniability. He identifies two types of 
strategic goals sought through the employment of proxies: coercing and coping with 
an adversary, whose differences are presented by contrasting the rationale behind 
the US decision to support Syrian rebels against President Bashar al-Assad with the 
Iranian strategy of proxy war in Syria. 
[end abstract] 
 
In 2016, then British Foreign Minister Boris Johnson came under fire by the Cabinet 
for disparaging the role of one of the country’s closest allies in the Middle East, Saudi 
Arabia. He claimed that: 
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There are politicians who are twisting and abusing religion and different strains of the 
same religion in order to further their own political objectives. That’s one of the 
biggest political problems in the whole region. And the tragedy for me – and that’s 
why you have these proxy wars being fought the whole time in that area – is that 
there is not strong enough leadership in the countries themselves. … That’s why 
you’ve got the Saudis, Iran, everybody, moving in, and puppeteering and playing 
proxy wars.1 
 
Johnson’s puppeteering remarks concerned Yemen, a country whose civil war 
saw direct Saudi and Emirati military intervention, and highly disputed proxy 
intervention in the form of Iranian support to Houthi rebels.2 They also underline 
how policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have come to view the complexity of 
Middle Eastern politics through the lens of proxy wars, while simultaneously publicly 
condemning and secretly waging them.3 The practitioners’ emphasis on the value of 
the notion of ‘proxy war’ has been mirrored by the nascent literature on proxy war4 
 
1 Patrick Wintour, Rowena Mason and Saeed Kamali Dehghan, ‘Johnson Says Saudi Arabia is a 
“Puppeteer” in Middle East Proxy Wars’, The Guardian, 8 December 2016. 
2 Joseph L Votel, ‘Great Power Competition: The Current and Future Challenges in the Middle East’, 
Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Posture of US Central Command, 5 
February 2019. 
3 Mark Mazzetti, Adam Goldman and Michael S Schmidt, ‘Behind the Sudden Death of a $1 Billion 
Secret C.I.A. War in Syria’, New York Times, 2 August 2017. 
4 Eli Berman and David A Lake (eds), Proxy Wars: Suppressing Violence Through Local Agents 
(Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2019); Tyron L Groh, Proxy War: The Least Bad 
Option (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2019); Jakob Hauter, ‘Delegated Interstate War: 
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and the expansion of the literature on the links between civil war and the provision of 
external support to warring factions.5 This debate has drawn on the transformation of 
 
Introducing an Addition to Armed Conflict Typologies’, Journal of Strategic Security (Vol. 12, No. 4, 
2019), pp. 90-103; Vladimir Rauta, ‘A Structural-Relational Analysis of Party Dynamics in Proxy 
Wars’, International Relations (Vol. 32, No. 4, 2018), pp. 449–67; Vladimir Rauta and Andrew 
Mumford, ‘Proxy Wars and the Contemporary Security Environment’, in Robert Dover, Huw Dylan 
and Michael S Goodman (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of Security, Risk and Intelligence (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 99–116; Seyom Brown, ‘Purposes and Pitfalls of War by Proxy: A 
Systemic Analysis’, Small Wars and Insurgencies (Vol. 27, No. 3, 2016), pp. 243–57; Andrew 
Mumford, Proxy Warfare (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013); Geraint Hughes, My Enemy’s Enemy: 
Proxy Warfare in International Politics (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2012). 
5 Noel Anderson, ‘Competitive Intervention, Protracted Conflict, and the Global Prevalence of Civil 
War’, International Studies Quarterly (Vol. 63, No. 4, 2019), pp. 692–706; Marina G Petrova, ‘What 
Matters is Who Supports you: Diaspora and Foreign States as External Supporters and Militants’ 
Adoption of Nonviolence’, Journal of Conflict Resolution (Vol. 63, No. 9, 2019), pp. 2155–79; Mark 
Toukan, ‘International Politics by Other Means: External Sources of Civil War’, Journal of Peace 
Research (Vol. 55, No. 6, 2019), pp. 812–26; Ryan Grauer and Dominic Tierney, ‘The Arsenal of 
Insurrection: Explaining Rising Support for Rebels’, Security Studies (Vol. 27, No. 2, 2018), pp. 263–
95; Lise Morjé Howard and Alexandra Stark ‘How Civil Wars End: The International System, Norms, 
and the Role of External Actors’, International Security(Vol. 42, No. 3, 2017/2018), pp. pp. 127-171; 
Niklas Karlén, ‘The Legacy of Foreign Patrons: External State Support and Conflict Recurrence’, 
Journal of Peace Research (Vol. 54, No. 4. 2017), pp. 499–512; Belgin San-Akca, States in Disguise: 
Causes of State Support for Rebel Groups (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Idean Salehyan, 
‘The Delegation of War to Rebels’, Journal of Conflict Resolution (Vol. 54, No. 3, 2010), pp. 493–
515. 
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contemporary civil wars into complex proxy wars in strategic settings ranging from 
South-East Ukraine6 and central Africa7 to the porous borders of Syria8 and Yemen.9  
In 2013, the RUSI Journal published Andrew Mumford’s discussion on the role 
of proxy warfare in shaping future conflict10 as a preamble to his wider analysis of the 
phenomenon.11 Taken together, Mumford’s work revived a debate long ignored by 
strategic and security studies. Fast forward six years and the future of proxy wars has 
become their present focus. For example, seven entries into the International Crisis 
Group’s ‘10 Conflicts to Watch in 2020’ are currently being shaped by proxy 
 
6 Andrew S Bowen, ‘Coercive Diplomacy and the Donbas: Explaining Russian Strategy in Eastern 
Ukraine’, Journal of Strategic Studies (Vol. 42, No. 3–4, 2019), pp. 312–43; Vladimir Rauta, ‘Proxy 
Agents, Auxiliary Forces, and Sovereign Defection: Assessing the Outcomes of Using Non-State 
Actors in Civil Conflicts’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies (Vol. 16, No. 1, 2016), pp. 91–
111. 
7 Henning Tamm, ‘Status Competition in Africa: Explaining the Rwandan–Ugandan Clashes in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo’, African Affairs (Vol. 118, No. 472, 2019), pp. 509–30; Noel 
Twagiramungu et al., ‘Re-Describing Transnational Conflict in Africa’, Journal of Modern African 
Studies (Vol. 57, No. 3, 2019), pp. 377–91; Quint Hoekstra, ‘The Effect of Foreign State Support to 
UNITA During the Angolan War (1975–1991)’, Small Wars and Insurgencies (Vol. 29, No. 5–6, 
2018), pp. 981–1005. 
8 Keith A Grant and Bernd Kaussler, ‘The Battle of Aleppo: External Patrons and The Victimization 
of Civilians in Civil War’, Small Wars and Insurgencies (Vol. 31, No. 1, 2020), pp. 1-33; Haian 
Dukhan, State and Tribes in Syria: Informal Alliances and Conflict Patterns (New York, NY and 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2019); Christopher Phillips, The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in The 
New Middle East (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2016). 
9 Jack Watling, ‘Iran’s Objectives and Capabilities: Deterrence and Subversion’, RUSI Occasional 
Papers (February 2019). 
10 Andrew Mumford, ‘Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict’, RUSI Journal (Vol. 158, No. 2, 
2013), pp. 40–46. 
11 Mumford, Proxy Warfare.  
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dimensions: Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Libya, Kashmir, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen. 
Take for example Libya, now a veritable microcosms of proxy intervention: 
 
As a result, the conflict’s protagonists are no longer merely armed groups in Tripoli 
fending off an assault by a wayward military commander. Instead, Emirati drones and 
airplanes, hundreds of Russian private military contractors, and African soldiers 
recruited into Haftar’s forces confront Turkish drones and military vehicles, raising the 
spectre of an escalating proxy battle on the Mediterranean. 12 
 
Moreover, a recent paper by Jack Watling also included proxy warfare as one of its 
contemporary schools of thought.13 This article develops Mumford’s analysis of the 
changing dynamics of proxy wars and argues for a relocation of proxy wars on a 
strategic footing by conceptualising them as strategic bargains waged on more 
complex grounds than risk avoidance, cost efficiency and deniability. 
First, the article briefly explores the issue of defining proxy wars. Second, it 
argues that the thinking about proxy wars should differentiate between strategic 
advantages and strategic goals. To this end, there is a brief survey of the 
contemporary reach of proxy wars with the aim of capturing the variation in reasons 
for waging proxy wars. The article then identifies two types of strategic goals sought 
through the employment of proxies: coercing and coping with an adversary. The 
 
12 Robert Malley, ‘10 Conflicts to Watch in 2020’, Foreign Policy, 26 December 2019.  
13 Jack Watling, ‘Proxy Warfare: Iran’, in Peter Roberts (ed.), ‘The Future Conflict Operating 
Environment Out to 2030’, RUSI Occasional Papers (June 2019), pp. 11–18. 
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differences between the two are delineated by contrasting the rationale behind the 
US decision to support Syrian rebels against President Bashar al-Assad with the 
Iranian strategy of proxy war in Syria. The article concludes by showing how a more 
nuanced grasp of explanations of proxy wars helps with their rapid integration into 
the broader spectrum of contemporary violence from great power competition to 
cyber and hybrid warfare. 
 
[h1]Preliminary Clarifications of the Concept 
In 2018, David Ucko and Thomas Marks argued that the US and the West ‘are 
conceptually under-equipped to grasp, let alone counter, violent political 
challenges’.14 Except for the notions of ‘asymmetric warfare’ and ‘hybrid 
war/warfare’,15 the concept of ‘proxy war’ is best exemplified Ucko and Marks’ stern 
warning. For a long time, the literature has claimed that proxy wars are under-
conceptualised and under-theorised,16 or, perhaps even more poignantly, rejected 
the concept outright and replaced it with conceptual alternatives.17 This context 
allowed Mumford to open the debate, partly in this journal, and to define proxy wars 
as ‘the indirect engagement in a conflict by third parties wishing to influence its 
 
14 David H Ucko and Thomas A Marks, ‘Violence in Context: Mapping the Strategies and Operational 
Art of Irregular Warfare’, Contemporary Security Policy (Vol. 39, No. 2, 2018), pp. 206–33. 
15 Vladimir Rauta, ‘Towards a Typology of Non-State Actors in “Hybrid Warfare”: Proxy, Auxiliary, 
Surrogate, and Affiliated Forces’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs (Online First, 2019). 
16 Bowen ‘Coercive Diplomacy and the Donbas’; Candace Rondeaux and David Sterman, ‘Twenty-
First Century Proxy Warfare’, New America, February 2019. 
17 San-Akca, States in Disguise. 
7 
 
strategic outcome’.18 With a rapid expansion in the literature over the last decade, 
there is now a much clearer understanding of the concept of proxy warfare and 
strong evidence that it has gained significant policy traction.  
Brendan Sozer speaks of proxy warfare ‘as an external actor(s) seeking to 
indirectly influence the outcome of a conflict in pursuit of their strategic policy 
objectives by providing direct and intentional assistance to an existing actor in the 
conflict’.19 This is similar to Tyron Groh’s assessment that proxy wars involve 
‘directing the use of force by a politically motivated, local actor to indirectly influence 
political affairs in the target state’.20 Finally, I provided elsewhere a more expansive 
definition accodingaccording to which a proxy war is ‘a violent armed interaction 
resulting from the polarization of competing political goals between two organised 
parties, a Beneficiary and a Target, in which at least one party engages the other 
indirectly in sustained collective violence through a third party, the Proxy’.21 Whilst 
there is still some debate over concepts,22 scholars agree on a set of core features of 
proxy war: the role of the third party; indirect intervention; and an essentially 
relational interaction between actors. The literature thus addressed David Sterman’s 
 
18 Mumford, Proxy Warfare, p. 1. 
19 Brendan Sozer, ‘Development of Proxy Relationships: A Case Study of the Lebanese Civil War’, 
Small Wars and Insurgencies (Vol. 27, No. 4, 2016), p. 643. 
20 Groh, Proxy War, p. 29. 
21 Rauta, ‘A Structural-Relational Analysis of Party Dynamics in Proxy Wars’, p. 457. 
22 Sozer, ‘Development of Proxy Relationships’, p. 643; Vladimir Rauta et al., ‘A Symposium – 
Debating “Surrogate Warfare” and the Transformation of War’, Defence Studies (Vol. 19, No. 4, 
2019), p. 8. 
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suggestion that the definition of a proxy war needs to be focused on ‘the 
constitutional status of the agents and actors involved in a conflict, rather than purely 
on the degree to which an external power is involved’.23 With more dynamic 
conceptualisations, the debate has slowly moved on from seeing ‘proxy war’ as ‘a 
dirty word in foreign affairs’,24 and this article draws on this by developing a strategic 
understanding of its appeal and logic.  
 
[h1]Towards a Strategic Understanding of Proxy Wars 
[h2]The Policy Appeal of Proxy Wars: Strategic Advantages and Strategic Goals 
References to contemporary proxy wars demonstrate the significant challenge they 
pose to the international security environment.25 As Geraint Hughes aptly puts it, 
proxy wars offer ‘a superficially seductive policy option to any state that is (to quote 
Alexander Pope) “[willing] to wound, and yet afraid to strike”’.26 It is no surprise then 
that proxy wars extend beyond the violence of the Syrian, Iraqi or Yemeni civil wars. 
In 2019, in a remarkable recognition of the threat of proxy wars to the international 
security environment, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the Ethiopian Prime 
Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali for his efforts to resolve the border conflict with 
 
23 David Sterman, ‘How Do We Move Beyond “Proxy” Paralysis?’, New America, 7 March 2019. 
24 Sozer, ‘Development of Proxy Relationships’, p. 643. 
25 Rauta and Mumford, ‘Proxy Wars and the Contemporary Security Environment’.  
26 Geraint Alun Hughes, ‘Syria and the Perils of Proxy Warfare’, Small Wars and Insurgencies (Vol. 
25, No. 3, 2014), p. 523.  
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neighbouring Eritrea27. Their 1998–2000 inter-state war, resulting in catastrophic 
fatalities on both sides and ending in a military stalemate, had taken the shape of 
low-intensity proxy wars for almost two decades and engulfed most of the Horn of 
Africa.  
In its sixth year now, the violence in South-East Ukraine exposes other facets 
of the strategic use of proxies. The escalation of protests in Kiev in November 2013 
was followed first by the March 2014 annexation of the Crimea Peninsula by the 
Russian Federation, and second by a separatist civil war. Ukraine presents a clear case 
of complementary direct and indirect military interventions which has attracted 
fervent scholarly dialogue.28 On the one hand, the annexation of Crimea was a case 
of covert direct military intervention carried out by Russian Special Forces with the 
help of local auxiliaries. On the other, the violence in the south-east became a proxy 
war orchestrated and managed by Russia for the exact purposes of wounding the 
authorities in the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv.  
This combination of pathways for a broader set of strategic goals speaks 
directly to the assertion of former Commander of the UK’s Joint Forces Command, 
General Richard Barrons that ‘proxy warfare is the most successful kind of political 
war being waged of our generation’.29 This section argues that what makes proxy 
 
27 BBC, ‘Nobel Peace Prize: Ethiopia PM Abiy Ahmed Wins’, 11 October 2019. 
28 Lawrence Freedman, Ukraine and the Art of Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019); 
Bowen ‘Coercive Diplomacy and the Donbas’; Rauta, ‘Proxy Agents, Auxiliary Forces, and 
Sovereign Defection’. 
29 Roberts, ‘The Future Conflict Operating Environment Out to 2030’, p. 11. 
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wars successful is their ability to help meet the demands of a range of strategic goals 
and not merely ease or facilitate the waging of international war. A wider remit of 
purposes was drawn by Daniel Byman and colleagues early in the debate and 
repeated in the literature in various degrees of detail, including: irredentism; prestige; 
regime change; plunder; strengthening internal security; and supporting co-
religionists and co-ethnics.30 For example, the strategy of retaliation through proxy 
that characterised Ethiopian–Eritrean relations for the last 20 years is similar in 
practice but different in strategic logic to Russia’s strategy of supporting so-called 
‘separatists’ against Ukraine. Both are also distinct in strategic makeup to Iran’s 
employment of an infrastructure of proxies in the Middle East. The US delegating war 
to Kurdish factions to fight Daesh (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, 
ISIS) in Syria accompanied by US airpower support31 was informed by different 
considerations from the Cold War calculus leading President Richard Nixon’s 
administration in 1972 to arm Kurdish groups to fight the Iraqi regime, following 
pressure from the Shah of Iran.32  
In order to prevent or prevail in fighting proxy wars, a strategic understanding 
of why proxy wars are waged is needed. This article proposes differentiating between 
 
30 Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Barbara, CA: 
RAND, 2005). 
31 Ben Hubbard et al., ‘Abandoned by U.S. in Syria, Kurds Find New Ally in American Foe’, New 
York Times, 13 October 2019. 
32 Asaf Siniver, Nixon, Kissinger, and US Foreign Policy Making (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008). 
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the advantages and goals of waging proxy wars. Since Mumford opened the debate, 
proxy wars have been measured against their ability to offer an easy solution to 
complex problems and ‘to hit the political sweet spot’.33 In Byman’s view, proxies 
‘enable intervention on the cheap. They cost a fraction of the expense of deploying a 
state’s own forces and the proxy does the dying. Because the costs are lower, proxy 
war is also more politically palatable’.34 And next to cost-effectiveness are 
deniability,35 risk aversion and shock absorption.  
Yet, what actors want to achieve by choosing a proxy (in other words their 
range of goals) is not sufficiently integrated in current examinations of the problem. 
Next this article presents proxy wars as strategic bargains and outlines two goal-
focused strategies of waging proxy wars: coping and coercing. These are explored by 
comparing the US decision to support Syrian rebels against al-Assad’s regime with 
the Iranian strategy of proxy war in Syria in support of the same regime. 
 
[h2]Proxy Wars as Strategic Bargains: Coping and Coercing 
The literature usually describes proxy wars as a two-step process: the delegator of 
war (the Beneficiary) decides on the allocation of resources and the Proxy decides on 
the distribution of said resources against the target adversary. It is often mentioned 
that the process of decision-making involves conditionality concerning issues of 
 
33 Daniel Byman, ‘Why States are Turning to Proxy Wars’, National Interest, 26 October 2018. 
34 Byman, ‘Why States are Turning to Proxy Wars’. 
35 Rory Cormac and Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Grey is the New Black: Covert Action and Implausible 
Deniability’, International Affairs (Vol. 94, No, 3, 2018), pp. 477–94. 
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control, management of the relationship, and the delivery of strategic outputs36. To 
this end, explanations have centred on supply-demand models, goal-preference 
dynamics, or selection mechanisms, with each presenting different accounts of how 
the parties give and take and decide over the responsibility over and the conduct of 
war.37 Yet, what the Beneficiary wants to achieve in terms of its strategic goals 
regarding the target is insufficiently discussed in a theoretically meaningful way. To 
address this, this article reconceptualises proxy wars as: a strategic enterprise 
involving at least two parties negotiating over the delegation, management and 
pursuit of indirect war against a target adversary.  
Proxy wars are strategic bargains requiring dynamic and purposeful 
interaction, and entailing a range of trade-offs: between available proxies; between 
what one party wants to achieve and what it does achieve; between competing 
agendas and competing targets; between the ambition of control over the proxy and 
the practical implementation of control; and between diverging trajectories strategic 
goals may take once war is underway.38 This is essentially a bargaining situation ‘in 
which the ability of one participant to gain his ends is dependent to an important 
 
36 Salehyan, ‘The Delegation of War to Rebels’. 
37 Rauta, ‘A Structural-Relational Analysis of Party Dynamics in Proxy Wars’; San-Akca, States in 
Disguise; Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and David E Cunningham, ‘Explaining External 
Support for Insurgent Groups’, International Organization (Vol. 65, No. 4, 2011), pp. 709-744. 
38 Navin A Bapat, ‘Understanding State Sponsorship of Militant Groups’, British Journal of Political 
Science (Vol. 42, No. 1, 2012), pp. 1–29. 
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degree on the choices or decisions that the other participant will make’,39 with the 
difference that the chain of participants is no longer dyadic, but triadic. 
More importantly, in delegating to the Proxy, the Beneficiary essentially 
decides on its target-related aims. Here the article draws the following distinction 
between goals: it proposes that goals are understood as a binary of strategic 
coercion and coping with an adversary. The distinction is grounded in Rupert Smith’s 
observation, according to which,  
 
‘the main difference between confrontations and conflicts [is] their purpose. In 
confrontations the aim is to influence the opponent, to change or form an intention, 
to establish a condition and, above all, to win the clash of wills. In conflicts the 
purpose is to destroy, take, hold; to forcibly attain a decisive outcome by the direct 
application of military force’.40  
 
This distinction allows the understanding of coercion as a compliance-seeking 
endeavour which, as C R Mitchell argued, forces the opponent to ‘abandon its goals 
by imposing unacceptable costs on goal-seeking behaviour’;41 and coping as a 
 
39 Thomas C Schelling, ‘The Retarded Science of International Strategy’, Midwest Journal of Political 
Science (Vol. 4, No. 2, 1960) pp. 110. 
40 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern War (London: Penguin Books, 
2006), p. 182.  
41 C R Mitchell, The Structure of Conflict (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1981), p. 122. 
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mechanism of waging and yielding of violence outside a submission-seeking intent 
and more as a tool of managing an adversary.  
By distinguishing between these two strategies of proxy war, this article 
highlights a missing layer in the explanations: that proxy wars are waged for both 
maximalist, coercive goals as well as for discrete, conservative goals such as the 
management of (parts of) complex issues. It draws attention to the strategic variation 
of wars by proxy indirect war and to the essentially iterative character of the 
bargaining: the parties do not negotiate only once, but repeatedly following the pace 
of the war itself. Specifically, this is not a one-time grant of war responsibility, but a 
series of strategic decisions: first, concerning the aims of the war (and the target); 
second, the choice of proxy; third, the balancing between the Beneficiary and proxy 
agendas.  
 
[h2]One War, Two Strategies  
In this sub-section, the differences between the two strategies of coercion and 
coping are briefly sketched by comparing former US President Barack Obama’s 
decision to support Syrian rebels against al-Assad’s regime with the Iranian strategy 
of proxy war in Syria in support of the same regime. The two cases speak to the 
strategic logics of coping and coercing as ideal types and, as such, significant case 
complexity is sacrificed, allowing, however, future refinements of the argument. The 
empirical background for this short comparison is offered by the Syrian civil war, 
whose evolution from the Arab uprising to multiparty internationalised war needs 
15 
 
not be re-litigated here, as it has been discussed in the pages of this journal42 and 
elsewhere.43 The Syrian civil war is relevant for this article’s discussion given that it 
has become the contemporary archetype of wars by proxy.44  
Obama’s vacillation over the decision to support or not support Syrian rebels 
underlines the utility of proxy wars as strategic coping mechanisms, and recently 
published Obama-era memoirs from staffers and cabinet members45 confirm this. 
The first proposal to support Syrian rebels was made in autumn 2012, and Ben 
Rhodes, then Deputy National Security Adviser for Strategic Communications, 
characterised it as a ‘small-scale recommendation to engage a portion of the 
opposition, providing them with a fraction of the support that Russia and Iran were 
providing to the Assad regime’.46 Then CIA Director, David Petraeus, advanced the 
plan, receiving support from then Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, who placed the 
Syrian conflict in the context of a wider regional proxy war and emphasised the role 
 
42 Susan Schulman, ‘From Homs to Aleppo: A Journey Through the Destruction of the Syrian War’, 
RUSI Journal (Vol. 162, No. 6, 2017), pp. 44–59; Susan Schulman, ‘From Homs to Aleppo: A 
Journey Through the Destruction of the Syrian War’, RUSI Journal (Vol. 163, No. 1, 2018), pp. 62–
81. 
43 Dukhan, State and Tribes in Syria; Tom Smith et al., ‘Understanding the Syria Babel: Moral 
Perspectives on the Syrian Conflict from Just War to Jihad’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 3 
December 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1523358>, accessed 11 December 2019. 
44 Olivia Giles, ‘How did the Syrian Civil War Become a Proxy War?’, National Interest, 13 
September 2019. 
45 Peter Beinar, ‘Obama’s Idealists: American Power in Theory and Practice’, Foreign Affairs, 
November/December 2019. 
46 Ben Rhodes, The World as It Is: Inside the Obama White House (London: Penguin Random House 
2018), p. 198. 
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of Hizbullah as Iran’s proxy in Lebanon and Syria.47 Both Clinton and Petraeus 
presented the proxy option first and foremost as a strategy of managing the 
situation. Ben Rhodes explains: ‘[Petraeus] was also honest about what it was and 
wasn’t: This won’t change the direction of the war, he’d say; it will allow us to build 
relationships with the opposition’.48 In her memoirs, Clinton was adamant that ‘the 
idea was to give us a partner on the ground we could work with that could do 
enough to convince Assad and his backers that a military victory was impossible’.49 
Similarly, National Security Adviser, Susan Rice, argued that the rebels could only 
have increased military pressure yet at no point significantly threatened the regime. 
In fact, Rice defended retrospectively Obama’s decision questioning ‘the wisdom or 
arming and training the Syrian rebels’ given it would have merely created a 
temporary stalemate.50 
Leon Panetta, then US Secretary of Defense, and James Clapper, then Director 
of National Intelligence, argued that any shifts in the goals of the proxy policy were 
impeded by the twin problems of Assad’s military strength and Russian support, as 
well as the rebels’ lack of organisation and ties to terrorist groups.51 Susan Rice 
 
47 Hillary Rodham Clinton, Hard Choices (London: Simon & Schuster, 2014), p 349. 
48 Rhodes, The World as It Is, p. 198. Emphasis in original. 
49 Clinton, Hard Choices, p. 392. 
50 Susan Rice, Tough Love. My Story of the Things Worth Fighting For (New York, NY, London: 
Simon & Schuster, 2019), p. 368. 
51 Leon Panetta, Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace (New York, NY: Penguin 
Press, 2014); James R Clapper, Facts and Fears: Hard Truths from a Life in Intelligence (New York, 
NY: Viking, 2018), p. 168. 
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emphasised the particular difficulty of ‘how to help the good guys, and those in the 
gray area, without inadvertently providing sophisticated weapons and training to 
terrorists.’52 Initially, Obama rejected the proxy proposal, and United States Deputy 
Secretary of State, William Burns, recounts that the weight of the US’s history of 
proxy wars outweighed the confidence of the intelligence agencies to quickly and 
effectively arm and train Syrian rebels.53 Obama reversed course after al-Assad’s use 
of chemical weapons by joining Sunni Arab and Turkish US partners in arming and 
training Syrian rebels, an effort that expanded once countering Daesh gained 
strategic priority. 
Limited and conservative in terms of what they wanted to achieve, the CIA 
covertly armed and trained rebels in the Free Syrian Army, and the Pentagon later set 
up and began arming the Syrian Democratic Forces,54 and their failures have been 
discussed at length chiefly of which the repeated clashes between CIA and Pentagon 
sponsored rebel groups55. Yet in trying to manage a strategically unmanageable 
situation, this proxy policy of coping with an entrenched crisis was, in Burns’ words, 
‘never about victory on the battlefield.’56 Rather, 
 
52 Rice, Tough Love, p. 367. 
53 William J Burns, The Back Channel. A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for Its 
Renewal (New York, NY: Random House, 2019), p. 328. 
54 Ronan Farrow, War on Peace. The End of Diplomacy and the Decline of American Influence 
(London: William Collins, 2018), p. 156. 
55 Nabih Bulos, W J Hennigan and Brian Bennet, ‘In Syria, Militias Armed by the Pentagon Fight 
Those Armed by the CIA’, LA Times, 27 March 2016.  
56 Burns, The Back Channel, p. 327 
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‘It was about trying to demonstrate to Assad and his outside backers that he couldn’t 
win militarily, and that his political options were going to narrow the longer the 
fighting continued. It was a way to manage the opposition, and to use our provision 
of training and equipment to help make them a more coherent and responsive force.  
… I hated the then-fashionable term “skin in the game”, which always seemed too 
glib in the face of Syria’s ugly realities, but that was essentially what this was about’57 
 
To understand proxy wars seeking maximalist coercive goals, the article now turns to 
Iran’s proxy strategy in Syria. From the start, however, this must be couched in Iran’s 
broader approach to the Middle East involving a network of proxies meeting a range 
of strategic goals: from placating Israel, to countering its rival Saudi Arabia, to 
reducing US presence in Iraq, to fighting Daesh, and to effectively building a land 
corridor from Teheran to Damascus.58 As mentioned, Iran has sponsored the Houthi 
rebels to build ‘a proxy force designed to pressure the SLC [Saudi-led coalition] and 
expand Iranian regional influence’.59 Next to the Houthis, whose rise to prominence 
followed 2014, Iran has long cultivated a vast proxy network operating across the 
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Middle East with both successes and failures.60 Known as the ‘Axis of Resistance’61, 
Iran’s proxy network covers Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, organised 
under the aegis of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) elite Quds Force62. In 
spite of being part of the fabric of the Shia Crescent, these proxies have retained 
enormous strategic independence, operating in individual strategic contexts resulting 
in differentiated proxy relationships with Teheran. Hizbollah, for example, has long 
outgrown its proxy status, currently ranking as Iran’s oldest, most sophisticated, and 
best-armed ally.63 In Iraq, the network includes the Badr Organization, a political 
party which began as a covert organisation against Iraq President Saddam Hussein’s 
regime, now Iran’s most powerful Shiite proxy in the country64. Iran’s reach into Iraq 
has been facilitated by paramilitary groups such as Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asa’ib Ahl al-
Haq, and Saraya al-Salam (Peace Companies).65 These militias came to dominate the 
Popular Mobilisation Forces, the 100,000-member volunteer force set up following 
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the rise of Daesh also known as Hashb al-Shabi, and brought significant changes to 
the calculus of Iraqi security.66 
Since 2012, the IRGC has adapted the proxy patent, developed with Hizbullah 
and Shia militias across Syria. As Andreas Krieg and Jean-Mark Rickli noted recently, 
this is part and parcel of Iran’s mosaic defence in which decentralisation of command 
and delegation of warfighting are twinned with a high degree of strategic patience.67 
Established Iraqi militias such as the Badr Organization, Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asa’ib Ahl-
al-Haq, and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba organised, trained and supervised a pack of 
proxies whose role has been key to the Iranian support of al-Assad’s regime68. 
Following the proposed strategic logic, it could be argued that Iran has employed an 
essentially coercive logic of wars by proxy. First, Shia proxy militias played a critical 
role in defeating Syrian rebel groups and fighting Daesh. This was the case of the 
Liwa Fatemiyoun active in Syria from the early days of the conflict. Others, not only 
helped repel the rebels but were also key to ensuring control over strategically 
relevant town such as Qusair, Homs, Aleppo and Damascus.69 They did not simply 
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seek to defeat the rebels’ military, but to replace their authority entirely by erecting 
parallel security governance structures.70  
In stark contrast with the US effort to manage and cope with the wider 
problem of the Syrian civil war, Ranj Alaaldin explains that Iran’s proxy effort is 
decidedly oriented towards transforming ‘its proxies in Syria into fully entrenched 
components of whatever political system emerges from the ruins of conflict’.71 
Second, and more importantly, Iran’s proxy war effort is oriented towards securing 
strategic control over a land corridor linking Tehran to Beirut through Iraq and Syria. 
The political symbolism and strategic implications of this gambit’s potential success 
is manifold, involving Lebanon, Israel and Iraq.72 The expansion of Hizbullah‘s role 
beyond Lebanon afforded by the Syrian civil war helps locate Iran’s multi-front 
wars,73 but, more importantly, it speaks to Iran’s pan-Shia focus and how the changes 
brought to the Iranian way of war will not be confined to Syria.74  
Distinguishing between the two logics highlights their similarities and 
differences. As Brian Katz recently argued, ‘the Iranian approach to proxy warfare and 
how they cultivate binding partnerships with local actors offers lessons the United 
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States can learn from’.75 The two proxy war types presented in this article can help 
with the wider lesson-learning effort, especially as future intelligence assessments of 
the Middle East, according to the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 
are characterised by ‘[p]olitical turmoil, economic fragility, and civil and proxy wars’.76  
For policymakers this has significant implications as it can help distinguish between 
the positive and negative consequences of using third parties. Specifically, a 
differentiated and strategic understanding would help explain worst case scenarios in 
which conventional state-to-state is matched or driven by proxy fighting either in-
theatre or elsewhere. As General Kenneth F McKenzie, Jr took over command of US 
Central Command in March 2019, The Guardian reported that Iran’s most prominent 
military leader, Qasem Soleimani, leader of the Quds Force, issued an instruction to 
Iraqi militias ‘to prepare for proxy war’,77 attacked tankers in the Gulf of Oman,78 and 
had the IRGC use a surface-to-air missile to down a US MQ-4 Triton drone near the 
Strait of Hormuz.79 Later, the May–June 2019 escalation of tensions between the US 
and Iran raised the prospects of how Iran’s ‘threat network’ might be employed.80 As 
Peter Beinart observed, however, other than calls from foreign policy hawks for war 
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with Iran and qualifications of future consequences as ‘undesirable’, considerations of 
Iranian responses were largely mute.81 A war with Iran has the potential to include 
Iraq, as well as Afghanistan, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen,82 largely in its proxy war 
dimensions, whose implications should not be neglected. As the Trump 
administration approved the strike that killed Qasem Soleimani in early January 2020, 
the reality of a multi-front proxy war with Iran made the object of speculation about 
Iran’s response83. The likelihood of the United States finding itself at war with Iranian-
backed militias is high given the combination of the proxies’ ample space for 
strategic, independent action and the fact that Iran’s investment into this proxy 
network served to meet the demands of one such crisis. With Iran recalibrating its 
response, the future of Iran’s proxy network should not be dismissed for it extends 
beyond the proxies’ gravitation toward Soleimani’s rallying power84. Equally, and 
perhaps, more importantly, the reverse should not be the case either as power plays 
involving proxies have been a measure of Iran’s weakness, contributing to ‘Tehran’s 
outcast status, decreasing the country’s economic power and diplomatic clout’.85  
 
[h1]Conclusion: The Future of (the Study) of Proxy Wars 
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This article proposes a distinction between two ideal categories of goals behind 
proxy wars in the context of complex civil wars. It does so by drawing on Mumford’s 
programmatic piece on the future of proxy wars. Since then, proxy wars have been 
interwoven in escalatory state-to-state dynamics, great power competition and cyber 
or hybrid warfare. Giving the keynote address at the RUSI Land Warfare Conference 
in April 2019, former Defence Secretary Penny Mordaunt pointed to the current 
strategic context as one in which the UK has to ‘deal with the hybrid dangers as 
nations increasingly employ proxy actors to carry out aggression and intimidation at 
arms-length but now below the threshold of armed combat’.86 This serves, once 
more, to locate proxy wars as a widely spread security issue with an even wider 
empirical reach whose implications need to be given significant consideration.  
The policymakers’ emphasis on the proxy war dimension of contemporary war 
reveals a problem that has been not just long in the making but one that will shape 
political violence for the foreseeable future. This article aims to open this 
conversation on proxy wars and great power competition or cyber warfare by 
highlighting the need for strategic thinking to the essentially strategic employment 
of proxy wars.  The future study of the present and future of proxy wars speaks to the 
emergence of an enduring research programme whose findings will shape strategic 
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and policy thinking. As the world moves forward, this is essential since, as Daniel 
Byman put it, proxy warfare ‘is not going away’.87   
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